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This paper compares the Swiss and Norwegian European policies. It combines an 
analysis o f  the sectoral interests among the elite, based on a qualification o f 
Katzenstein’s small-state/flexible adjustment thesis, and an analysis o f the referendum 
behaviour, based on survey data. At the first level, it shows that the structure o f  each 
state’s economic dependence on the European Union (EU), on the one hand, and the 
threat o f  liberalisation among domestic sectors o f the economy, on the other, were 
more decisive than the ‘liberal’ or ‘social’ pattern o f  adaptation to international 
changes in shaping Swiss and Norwegian elite’s attitude towards European integration. 
At the second level, it suggests that if  taking part in the EU project -  be it through full 
membership or through membership in the European Economic Area -  is not perceived 
as an economic necessity, cultural and political factors can have a more decisive 























































































































































































With the popular rejection of the European Economic Area (EEA) on December 
6, 1992, and the disapproval of membership in the European Union (EU) on No­
vember 28, 1994, Switzerland and Norway became outliers in the process of 
European integration. This ‘No’ to Europe from two countries that differ so 
strongly from each other seems puzzling At first sight the literature on small 
European states provides little help to solve this puzzle. Thus, Switzerland’s and 
Norway’s response to the European challenge does not fit Katzenstein’s (1984, 
1985) emphasis on the ‘flexibility’ of the small states, nor is it in line with his 
distinction between the ‘liberal’ and ‘social’ adaptation to international economic 
changes. We argue that Katzenstein’s framework constitutes nevertheless a useful 
starting point to compare the Swiss and Norwegian cases, provided it is refined 
and extended. Firstly, Katzenstein did not pay enough attention to the division 
between externally oriented and domestic sectors of the economy. If this is taken 
into account together with each state’s economic dependence on the EU, the two 
countries do not differ as strongly as his classification might suggest, at least in 
the context of European integration. Secondly, Katzenstein’s framework fails to 
capture other societal cleavages that may be crucial for the determination of a 
country’s European policy, especially if they are mobilised in popular votes.
In this paper, we combine analyses of sectoral interests among the elites, and of 
the voters’ decision in the referendums to identify the determinants of the Swiss 
and Norwegian No to Europe. In the second section, we compare the attitude of 
Swiss and Norwegian elites towards participation in the EU single market in the 
light of a qualification of Katzenstein’s small-state/flexible adjustment thesis. 
Then, we extend our framework with a discussion of the main cleavages in Swiss 
and Norwegian politics. This will help us to identify the economic, cultural and 
political factors that could have shaped the Swiss and Norwegian attitudes to­
wards European integration. The last section is devoted to a detailed analysis of
‘ Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, Chicago, August 31-September 3, 1995 and at the Annual Meeting of the 
Swiss Political Science Association, Bern, October 12-13, 1995. The analysis o f the Norwe­
gian material draws heavily on joint work with Anders Todal Jenssen and Per Amt Pettersen. 
We wish to thank Reto Borsani, Eiler Fleicher, Simon Hug, Ame Kolstad, Kathrine Moen, Leonard 




























































































the referendums on European matters in Switzerland and Norway. As a first step, 
we recall the main features of the 1972 popular votes -  the Norwegian vote on 
European Community (EC) membership and the Swiss vote on the free-trade 
agreement with the EC. We then give some insights into the most recent referen­
dum campaigns, highlighting the stands held by the main political actors 
(government, political parties and interest groups) and the major arguments raised 
in the ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ camps. On the basis of survey data, we examine how these 
stands influenced the voting behaviour, with a special emphasis on the impact of 
economic, cultural and political cleavages in the 1992 (Swiss) and 1994 
(Norwegian) votes. In conclusion, we discuss the implications of our findings for 
both Katzenstein’s thesis and the Swiss and Norwegian European policies.
II. Switzerland and Norway in perspective
Switzerland and Norway, opposing cases o f ‘democratic corporatism ’?
In his study of the political economy strategies employed by the small European 
states to cope with international economic changes, Katzenstein (1984, 1985) 
characterised Switzerland as the paradigmatic case of ‘liberal democratic’ corpo­
ratism. According to him, Norway belongs to the other, ‘social’, variant of demo­
cratic corporatism, and employ accordingly a distinctive pattern of flexible adap­
tation.1
The crux of Katzenstein’s small-state/flexible adjustment thesis can be summa­
rised as follows. Because of their size, small states are dependent on world mar­
kets and therefore more open to the international economy than larger states. 
While protectionism is not an option for them, their small size makes them vul­
nerable to exogenous changes. In this context, internal conflict is a luxury that 
they can not afford. Rather, openness and vulnerability favours national consen­
sus through corporatist arrangements, i.e. through voluntary and informal co­
ordination of conflicting objectives through political bargaining among -  rela­
tively centralised and concentrated -  interest groups and state bureaucracies in a 
policy network (Katzenstein, 1985, pp. 87-94). In turn, this permanent co-
1 The Netherlands and Belgium also belong to the liberal variant, while Austria and Denmark 




























































































operation between the major private and public actors allows for a flexible adap­
tation to international economic changes. The two variants of democratic corpo­
ratism differ both in where (globally or nationally) and in how (privately or pub­
licly) the adjustment occurs (Katzenstein, 1985, p. 81). In liberal corporatist 
countries like Switzerland, adaptation is both offensive and global, and comprises 
aggressive and globally oriented responses to international challenges via foreign 
investment, private support of research and development policy, export drives, 
and so on. Domestic compensation for integration in the world economy relies 
primarily on market forces, i.e. on private strategies in the areas of economic 
planning, regional development or social welfare.2 This pattern of adaptation mir­
rors the domestic power configuration, namely the domination of the interna­
tionally oriented business and the political right, and the weakness of both the left 
and the state. By contrast, in social democratic countries like Norway, reactive 
and national strategies of flexible adaptation prevail. The economy is more pro­
tected against international competition than in the liberal variant, and responses 
to international changes have proceeded by small steps, excluding major recourse 
to foreign investment, export promotion, and the like. Compensations for the 
costs of adaptation rely heavily on state intervention and public investments at the 
national level, which reflects the strength of the left.
In the light of Katzenstein’s corporatist framework, the differences between 
Switzerland and Norway seem more salient than ever. However, both Katzen­
stein’s theoretical framework and its application to the Swiss or Norwegian cases 
are questionable (Kriesi, 1986; Hicks, 1988; Midttun 1990; Sciarini 1994). A 
qualification of this framework leads to a more balanced conclusion regarding the 
structural differences between the two countries and their related strategies to­
wards the process of European integration.
By focusing on the class cleavage, i.e. the cleavage between the business com­
munity and the labour movement, Katzenstein underestimates the impact of an­
other economic cleavage, namely the one opposing export oriented to domestic 
oriented sectors of the economy. To be sure, Katzenstein (1984, p. 91, 1985, p. 
84) points out that two different economic sectors have developed in Switzerland,
2 The low profile economic policy of the government is in line with the general ‘liberal evolu­
tion’ (Hotz, 1979) of Switzerland According to the subsidiarity principle, State intervention was 




























































































as in the other small European states: one externally oriented and competitive, the 
other internally oriented and protected. Surprisingly then, he does not really pay 
attention to the impact of these sectoral differences on the flexibility of the small 
states. In our view, the underlying diverging preferences of the two sectors form a 
central explanatory factor for the attitude of the Swiss and Norwegian elites to­
ward a possible participation in the single European market.
Overall, economic openness is considerable in Switzerland. Foreign economic 
relations have been the main source of the country’s prosperity and the Swiss 
economy is still of one of the most open with respect to many criteria. As a small 
economy, deprived of raw materials, Switzerland has had no choice but to sup­
port free trade in international negotiations like the GATT and to maintain low 
tariffs in foreign trade for industrial goods.3 Moreover, Switzerland has been a 
leading country in foreign direct investments since the beginning of the 20th cen­
tury (Bairoch, 1990, pp. 114-115). It is also an important financial centre and one 
third of the earnings of Swiss banks comes from activities or services abroad. On 
the other hand, however, internationalisation of the economy has in fact focused 
on only some branches of industry and services. Besides these sectors, many oth­
ers are mainly oriented toward the domestic economy, with high degrees of shel­
tering against international market forces.4 The most conspicuous example is ag­
riculture, which is broadly supported and protected by numerous state measures 
(Sciarim, 1994).5 But agriculture is not a unique case. Regulation either by the 
state or by private contractual arrangements (cartels, price maintenance and mo­
nopolies) to eliminate -  international, as well as domestic -  competition is also
3 Exports of goods and services make up half of the national product (one third for the sole 
exports of products -  machinery, electronics, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, textiles, watches). In 
1990, Switzerland was the fifth largest exporter of services in the world. Swiss openness with re­
spect to trade of goods is, however, not an exception: the share of exports and imports to GDP is 
very similar to that of Norway and significantly lower that that of Belgium or the Netherlands.
4 While the existence of a dual economy is empirical evidence, there are many overlaps be­
tween the two sectors o f the economy. Thus, talking of a division of the economy is admittedly 
a simplification, but is justified by the analytical purpose.
s The history of Swiss agricultural policy has been strongly linked - and influenced by - the 
policy of neutrality: according to the strict Swiss conception of neutrality a neutral state should 
prepare for possible wars or import crises by securing a high degree of food self-sufficiency. 
Accordingly, farm production should be stimulated (i.e subsidised) and sheltered from inter­




























































































the rule in various areas of the secondary and tertiary domestic sectors (Rentsch, 
1989, p. 1), even though the situation has evolved these last years.6
The Swiss dual economic policy reflected a sort o f ‘division of labour’ inside the 
economy and allowed a peaceful resolution of conflicts for a long time; corpora- 
tist-driven arrangements have been favoured by the possibility of conciliating in­
terests of both sectors of the economy. More specifically, externally oriented 
sectors could adapt without questioning support and protection of domestic sec­
tors. However, the dual economic policy becomes problematic in a context of in­
creasing international competition (Knopfel, 1988): this shift highlights the need 
for structural adjustment that would improve the situation of the externally ori­
ented sector but, at the same time, becomes a threat for the internally-oriented 
sector, inveigled into the deregulation and liberalisation process. The resulting 
conflict between the two sectors may turn out to be more significant than the 
traditional cleavage between business and labour.
This split attitude applied to the road toward participation in the single European 
market. While satisfying the interests of the externally oriented Swiss economy, 
joining the internal market was seen as threat by many protected domestic sectors 
that were unwilling to liberalise and face an increasing international competition.7 
It should be added that the externally oriented sectors were themselves not as ac­
tive in supporting the EE A treaty as might have been expected (Sciarini, 1992). 
One main reason for this was that exports are but one aspect of the internationali­
sation of the Swiss economy, whose most specific aspect is the strength of tran­
snational companies. Oriented towards the world market, the latter were not so
6 Presumably, Katzenstein (1984, p. 91) underestimates both the size and the degree of protec­
tion of the domestic sector. Some scholars call the Swiss model a ‘selective liberalism’ 
(Danthine and Lambelet, 1987); they argue that it is mainly the absence of an effective anti­
trust policy -  which can in turn be considered as an adverse effect o f the Swiss ‘laissez-faire’ -  
that allowed all sorts o f cartels to flourish Changes occurred only recently. Under pressure of 
European integration and the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations, Switzerland had to 
reform its farm policy (Sciarini, 1994, 1995, 1996a) and its concurrence policy (adoption of 
new laws on cartels and on public procurements, and unilateral adaptation to EU technical 
standards -  see Cottier, 1996).
7 According to an official study, most part of the expected 0.4 to 0.6 percent additional eco­
nomic growth per year linked to integration in the internal market was due to liberalisation of 




























































































dependent on the access to the European single market.8 The most fervent sup­
porters of the EEA were the senior officials of the administration, who tried to 
use the EEA negotiation as a leverage to push for a reorientation of Swiss do­
mestic economic policy (Sciarmi, 1992).
A dual economy can also be identified in Norway, with oil and related industries 
on the one side, and the rest of economy with different degrees of sheltering 
against international market forces on the other (Midttun, 1990, pp. 310-313). 
Therefore, when studying adaptation, it is also necessary to differentiate between 
sectors of the economy. The huge economic surplus from its oil production has 
enabled Norway to subsidise a number of industries and to protect many sectors 
from international competition. In addition, the comparative advantage of cheap, 
abundant hydropower resources has given Norway a stable basis for industrial 
expansion in electrometal, electrochemical, paper, etc., and has also been used to 
soften international competitive pressure in the whole economy. This has, in turn, 
led to a structural conservatism, as well as to increases of wages, high income 
and price levels overall. Although a process of privatisation and deregulation was 
started in the eighties,9 structural adjustment and domestic policy changes were, 
as in Switzerland, key elements of the expected economic gains linked to integra­
tion in the EU (Haaland, 1990, p. 399). Not surprisingly, the less competitive 
domestic sectors, threatened by the prospects of liberalisation, opposed EU- 
membership.
The main difference with Switzerland lies in the fact that subsidisation of the do­
mestic economy has not been achieved through activities of competitive indus­
tries or services abroad, but through territorially attractive petroleum resources. 
Indeed, the exclusive character of its resource endowments and the oligopolistic 
character of international markets have sheltered the oil and related sectors from 
normal competition and have allowed the country to reap super-profits without 
relying on competitive skills (Midttun, 1990, pp. 310-311). This structural differ­
* 6 out of the 100 biggest multinational firms in the world are Swiss (only one is Norwegian). 
Moreover, if the EU is Switzerland’s first trading partner, economic relations with non-EU 
countries are still highly significant.
9 For instance, state monopolies in telecommunications were abandoned, and international 
competition was introduced to new sectors. This also applies to agriculture, but only in a com­
paratively modest degree; Norwegian agriculture was still, with the Swiss, the most strongly 




























































































ence is, however, of little significance in the European context. In the same way 
that the Swiss export oriented sectors were not critically dependent upon the EU, 
there was no crucial economic pressure on Norway to join the European single 
market, at least as long as the EU energy policy was loosely co-ordinated and did 
not discriminate against outsiders. With its relatively strong economy and its re­
serves of oil and other resources Norway seemed less in need of EU membership 
than most of its EFTA partners (Wennerlund, 1994, p. 10).
To summarise, one could say that the structure of each state’s economic depend­
ence on the EU, on the one hand, and the threat of liberalisation among domestic 
sectors of the economy, on the other, were more decisive than the ‘liberal’ or 
‘social’ pattern of adaptation in shaping Swiss and Norwegian elite’s attitude to­
wards European integration until the late eighties. Focusing on the economic fac­
tors would, however, lead to missing important aspects of the European policy in 
Switzerland and Norway. This is where Katzenstein’s framework is again flawed. 
The author’s priority is to explain the pacification of economic cleavages among 
the elite. Hence, his framework does not tell us anything about the impact ceother 
political cleavages on the flexibility of small states. Moreover, by focusing on the 
elite, Katzenstein’s model is of limited utility in situation when political decisions 
have to overcome the hurdle of a referendum. As recent votes on European inte­
gration show, public opinion can play a central role in foreign policy formula­
tion.10 To study the determinants of votes, one has therefore to rely on a broader 
framework, taking into account the main societal cleavages that can be decisive in 
shaping the electorate’s decision.
The cleavages in Swiss and Norwegian society
Rokkan’s (1970) work provides a useful starting point to describe the general 
make-up of cleavages in Switzerland and Norway, and the way they have been 
organised by political actors.11 He identifies four traditional cleavages that have
10 This holds particularly for Switzerland: historically, foreign policy almost totally escaped the 
mechanisms of direct democracy, however, the increasing inter-penetration of international and 
domestic politics that is associated with the process of globalisation, together with the partial 
revision of the Swiss constitution in 1977 that enlarged the judicial domain of foreign politics 
where direct democracy applies, enhance the electorate’s influence on the determination of 
Swiss foreign policy (Germann, 1994, Sciarini, 1994).
" As Bartolini and Mair (1990) point out, social stratification or cultural dividing lines remain 




























































































been very important in the past: the centre-periphery, the religious, the urban- 
rural and the class cleavages. Usually motivated by a linguistic defence of a 
specific territorial identity against the nation builders, the centre- periphery cleav­
age is assumed to be relatively unsalient in the Swiss federal system (Kriesi et al., 
1995, p. 10; Kriesi et al., 1996). This is firstly because Switzerland has ‘neither a 
true centre nor a true state’ (Badie and Bimbaum, 1979, p. 212) which could try 
to impose its culture on the peripheries. Second, federalism helped to pacify in­
ternal relationships among the subunits and between the subunits and the federal 
state (Linder, 1994). More specifically, no party exists explicitly to defend the 
interests of a linguistic region in Switzerland.12 Surprisingly then, Lijphart (1979) 
found that the linguistic cleavage was almost as prominent as the religious one in 
shaping the electoral behaviour at the beginning of the seventies; a recent study 
even argues that it has become the most important cleavage in the electoral arena 
(Trechsel, 1995). These results are, however, not due to the existence of a lin­
guistic cleavage per se but, rather, to the fact that some parties exist mainly in one 
of the linguistic regions:13 for instance, the Liberal party is almost exclusively a 
French-speaking party, while the Swiss People’s party or the Swiss Democrats 
are mostly German-speaking parties. Latent in Swiss politics, this cleavage can 
be mobilised through various channels, for instance in direct democratic votes 
where the opposition between the linguistic communities are increasingly fre­
quent, especially in foreign policy, federalism (share of competencies) and trans­
port policy (Kriesi et al., 1996).
In Norway, the tension between the political centre and the periphery is probably 
the most central theme of politics (Rokkan, 1967, 1970; Rokkan and Valen, 
1964). This conflict has several causes. First, it is related to the issue of national 
independence as the resistance to the political union with Sweden was stronger in 
the countryside than in the cities. Second, the difference along centre periphery 
lines has been cultural, as parts of the peripheries -  most notably in the South and
associated with a collective identity and political consciousness, on the one hand, and when 
they are ‘mobilised’ by political actors or institutions, on the other.
12 Exceptions to this rule are the short-lived attempt of the Unitary Party (Parti unitaire ro­
mand), which attempted but failed to gain representation in 1967 (Steiner, 1974: 59), and more 
recently the Lega dei Ticinesi, a populist party created to defend the interests o f the Italian­
speaking canton The Lega achieved even representation in National Council starting in 1991.
13 This, in turn, is the consequence of the decentralised organisation of the Swiss party system, 




























































































West -  have been aligned with the dominance of the counter-cultures: the 
Nynorsk language movement,14 the temperance movement, and a more fundamen­
tal form of pietistic Lutheranism. From the beginning the Liberal party (‘Venstre’) 
represented the interests of the periphery as well as the rural counter cultures of 
teetotalism, nynorsk and pietistic Lutheranism (Leiphart and Svasand, 1988). As 
a result of a split of the Liberal party in 1921, the Centre party, which is the farm­
ers’ party, also tries to portray itself as the defender of the geographical periphery 
in Norway.
The religious cleavage takes different forms in countries dominated by Catholics, 
in countries dominated by Protestants or in countries which are religiously mixed 
(Gallagher et al., 1992, p. 92). In the latter case, as in Switzerland, the religious 
cleavage has traditionally opposed Catholics and Protestants. Reflecting an insti­
tutional compromise conceded by the dominant Radical Protestants to the Con­
servative Catholics,15 the creation of the Swiss federation in 1848 provided the 
cantons with a high level of autonomy and allowed the Catholics to preserve 
control of their subculture (Kriesi, 1995, pp. 318-320). Moreover, the Catholics 
were progressively integrated into national politics and the federal administration 
according to their proportional size. Similarly, the Catholic opposition voiced by 
the Christian Democratic party was ultimately bought off through participation in 
the federal government.16 Highly salient in the past, at least among the electorate 
(Lijphart, 1979), the religious cleavage was largely pacified by the mid-seventies 
in Switzerland, as in most European countries (Kriesi et al., 1995, p. 12), and has 
lost most of its influence on the electoral behaviour (Trechsel, 1995).
Norway illustrates the case in which Protestants are dominant. Until recent years 
more than 90 percent belonged to the Lutheran state church. Religious conflict in
14 Based on dialects from the western parts of the country, the nynorsk language was launched to 
counter the role of Danish and later riskmal as the official administrative and urban language
15 Decisive builders o f the nation-state, the Radical Protestants favoured national centralisation, 
whereas the Conservative Catholic cantons were hostile to any kind of centralisation This is­
sue was so controversial that it caused a short civil war in 1847. Winners of the war, the Radi­
cal Protestants were ready to share power with the loser,
16 The strong confessional foundation of this party is proved by the fact that its elite is still en­
tirely composed of Catholics (Garcia, 1994a, p. 43). In contrast, Protestants are dominant in 
the Swiss People’s party and, to a lesser extent, in the two other government parties (the Radi­




























































































Norway has been of two types. The first is between various camps of Lutherans, 
where especially the strong lay movement has preached a more fundamental form 
of Protestantism which has been strongly critical of liberal theology and practice 
within the official state church. Second, the Lutheran lay movement and the offi­
cial church have on occasion been pitted against the state, for example on the 
amount of compulsory teaching of religion in the schools
Dominant in European politics of the 19th century (Rokkan, 1970), the rural-urban 
cleavage has lost a great deal of its significance since that time. This is partly due 
to the numerical decline of farmers, and partly to the economic support and pro­
tection they gained from the state. In Switzerland and Norway, as in most Euro­
pean countries, farmers have continued to show an impressive influence in the 
electoral channel and, even more strongly, in the process of corporate interest 
intermediation.17 While the political clout of Swiss farmers had been declining in 
the context of both the Uruguay Round talks in the GATT and the process of 
European integration, these challenges led the farming population to re-mobilise 
(Sciarini 1994,1995, 1996a).
The class cleavage is traditionally mirrored by the opposition between the politi­
cal left and right. In Switzerland, the conventional right (the Radical Democratic 
party, the Christian Democratic party and the Swiss People’s party) opposes the 
conventional left (the Socialist party and the Labour party). In addition, new far 
left and far right parties have emerged since the late sixties. With the narrowing 
of the traditional base of the labour movement, the increasing standard of living 
and the establishment of the welfare state, the mobilising capacity of the class 
cleavage has been weakened (Kriesi et al., 1995, p. 16). This holds particularly 
for Switzerland where the Social Democrats have been part of coalition govern­
ments throughout large parts of the post-war period. Still, various studies have 
shown that the left-right cleavage remains very salient -  perhaps the most salient 
-  in Swiss politics, at least among the political and party elite (Finger and Sci-
17 This widespread evidence has been strengthened in Switzerland by the institutions of direct 
democracy, which provided the peak association of producers -  the Swiss Farmers Union -  
with a veto power on the political process up to the beginning of the 1990s; in the party sys­
tem, farm interests were supported by the Swiss People’s party, created in response to the 
domination of urban interests inside the Radical Democratic party. At the end of the 1980s, 
almost 70 percent of the political elite working in the primary sector belonged to the Swiss 




























































































arini, 1991; Hug, 1994a; Kerr, 1981; Kriesi, 1980; Lehner, 1984; Sciarini and 
Finger, 1991). Among the public opinion, the impact of the class cleavages was 
also significant, especially in shaping the elector’s decision (Inglehart and Sidjan- 
ski, 1975). While this impact weakened during the eighties, be it in the electoral 
or in the referendum arena (Kriesi et al., 1996, Sardi and Widmer, 1993; 
Trechsel, 1995), this picture could again be slightly modified given the increased 
polarisation that arose from the 1995 national elections (Caramani, 1996).
In Norway class interests have been dominant in politics, but the traditional 
working class has long been in decline, as has voting along straight class lines 
(Valen, 1981; Listhaug, 1989; Listhaug, 1996; Ringdal and Hines, 1995). The 
Labour party has been the dominant party of power since the 1930s, although in 
the last decade it has been in government more because of the lack of unity of the 
non-socialists than its own political strength. Labour, in line with the numerical 
decline of prevailing constituencies, has tried to broaden its appeals to the new 
middle classes. With the return to power in the second half of the decade, and 
continuing in the nineties, the ‘modernised’ social democrats have continued 
along the path of liberalisation started by previous Conservative governments.18
In response to the fading of some of the historical cleavages in Swiss and Nor­
wegian politics, several attempts have been made to identify new emerging lines 
of conflict. We will test the impact of five of these on the European votes: educa­
tion, gender, generation, sector of occupation, and environment. These new con­
flicts are also linked to party formation, but in a less decisive way than the old 
cleavage structure. This might at least partly be accounted for by the fact that 
some of the old parties have been able to accommodate some of the new cleavage 
interests on their agendas. In Norway, the Socialist Left have had some success in 
appealing both to old politics and new politics over the recent elections (Aardal, 
1990). One notable exception of accommodation by the party system is provided 
in Switzerland by the environmental issue. Dissatisfaction with the way environ­
mental issue was approached by traditional politics favoured the emergence of a
18 On the other hand, the Liberal party has never been liberal in the free-market sense. Ex­
tremely heterogeneous, it has always faced the problem of embracing numerous cleavages and 
having no clear ideological identity Following a series of party splits, notably after the intro­
duction of proportional representation in 1921, the party was gradually reduced in size to the 




























































































green party in the seventies, first at the cantonal and then at the federal level 
(Hug, 1989, 1990).19
III. The Swiss and Norwegian votes on Europe
Historical background: the 1972 votes
On matters of European integration, the driving axiom of Swiss policy was to be 
economically as close as possible to Europe, while falling short of any political 
commitment. Up to the 1980s, the so-called ‘median strategy’ (‘between’ adhe­
sion and isolation) has allowed Switzerland to adapt ‘globally and offensively’, to 
use Katzenstein’s terms. The signing of the free trade agreement on industrial 
goods in 1972 provided Swiss export oriented sectors a better access to the 
European market while, at the same time, leaving both the fundamental institu­
tions -  neutrality, federalism, and direct democracy -  and the internally oriented 
sectors untouched.20 Therefore, it is not surprising that all the peak associations, 
as well as the unions and most of the political parties, supported the free trade 
agreement. On December 3, 1972, the agreement was accepted by 72.5 per cent 
of the electorate, with a 52.9 per cent turnout.21
The situation was totally different in Norway, where the 1972 referendum was 
not on free trade, but on EC membership. After a heated campaign 53.5 per cent 
voted ‘no’ on a turnout of 79.2 percent. The outcome was widely interpreted as a 
victory of mass over elites (Hellevik and Gleditsch, 1973). The major parties, La­
bour and the Conservatives, a strong majority in the Storting, and the national 
organisations of labour and business campaigned in favour of membership against 
an ad hoc movement created by farmers, left wing labour unions, minor left wing
19 Based on various cantonal formations, the Swiss green party was created at the federal level 
in 1987. The interesting point is that it quickly took a clear left stance (Sciarini and Finger, 
1991; Hug, 1994a, p. 68). In turn, the ecological issue was progressively integrated into Swiss 
politics, which contributed to a shift in the meaning of the left-right cleavage (Finger and Sci­
arini, 1991; Sciarini and Finger, 1991).
20 For instance, agricultural products were not included in the free trade agreement (Sciarini, 
1994, pp. 109-111).
21 According to the federal Constitution, a referendum was not required. Given the political 





























































































parties, the agrarian Centre party, and youth organisations that were against 
membership. The ‘no’-vote was strongest in the rural areas and in Northern Nor­
way and reflected in general the traditional cleavage structure of Norwegian so­
ciety and politics (Valen, 1973).
1992 and 1994: The referendum campaigns
Switzerland has a very long tradition of direct democracy. However, the EEA 
referendum campaign was marked by a level of political mobilisation hardly met 
before (Kriesi et al., 1993, pp. 6-22; Longchamp, 1993). According to survey 
data, a majority of Swiss citizens was ready to endorse the EEA agreement at the 
time of its signing, in May, 1991.22 In the autumn, the EEA Treaty gained wide 
support among the political elite: accepted by an overwhelming majority in the 
two Chambers of Parliament (62 percent o f ‘yes’ in the National Council, 85 per­
cent in the State Council),23 it was also unanimously supported by the states 
(cantons) governments. Among the political parties, three out of the four govern­
mental coalition parties recommended the ‘yes’: the Radical Democratic Party, 
the Christian Democratic Party, and the Socialist Party. Only the agrarian and 
right wing Swiss People’s party rejected the Treaty. Other opponents were na­
tionalist parties (the Swiss Democrats and the Freedom Party), and some cantonal 
sections of the Greens. As usual, the political parties played, however, a minor 
role in the referendum campaign,24 which was actually led by ad hoc committees 
and economic associations.
Within the economy, the peak associations disagreed on the EEA issue. They op­
posed along the line of conflict presented above, i.e. according to their interest as 
domestic or external sectors of the economy. The EEA Treaty was supported by 
the business community active abroad -  represented by the Swiss Federation of 
Commerce and Industry (the so-called ‘ Vorort’) -  and by the Trade Unions. Rep­
22 55 percent in favour, 30 rather against, and 15 undecided (Kriesi et al. 1993, p. 13). Note, 
however, that citizens were little informed about the EEA and its expected effects at this time, 
only one third o f the electorate considered itself to be sufficiently informed; this proportion 
increased during the campaign to two third of the voters (Kriesi et al. 1993, p. 8).
23 While the Treaty was almost unanimously supported by the French-speaking deputies, the 
German speaking deputies were more divided (only 55 per cent of the German-speaking depu­
ties in the National Council accepted the Treaty).
24 This is not surprising, since Swiss parties and Parliament have remained silent in the Euro­




























































































resenting mostly the domestic sectors, the Swiss Association of Small Businesses 
was divided on the issue: the national association accepted the Treaty with a short 
majority, but some cantonal members recommended the ‘no’. Finally, the Swiss 
Farmers’ Union rejected the EEA, even though agriculture was almost totally ex­
cluded from the Treaty.
In the ‘no’-camp, ad hoc committees such as the powerful ‘Action for an Inde­
pendent and Neutral Switzerland’ were very active. Starting their campaign very 
early, they immediately took a decisive lead and compelled the partisans to a de­
fensive role. According to a quantitative analysis of newspaper ads, the opposi­
tion have dominated the supporters on practically all arguments (Schneider and 
Hess, 1995). Furthermore, they tried to dramatise the debate with emotional ar­
guments on the loss of sovereignty and neutrality, the decline of direct democ­
racy, the threat of massive immigration and the resulting rise of unemployment, 
the decrease of wages, and so on. The success of this strategy has been favoured 
by the sudden turns of Swiss government: having repeatedly claimed that the 
EEA was not a good agreement since it lacked codecision procedures, it finally 
endorsed it, but only as a first step toward full membership in the EU.25 The op­
position did not miss the opportunity to use the resulting confusion between EEA 
and EU membership to launch -  especially in the German-speaking region -  a 
fundamental debate on the future of the country and its main institutions. The ra­
tional-based arguments of the partisans emphasising the economic advantages of 
EEA-membership were of comparatively limited effectiveness. The task of EEA 
supporters was all the more difficult since the Swiss government surprisingly de­
cided to submit the Treaty to a compulsory referendum, namely a referendum that 
must win with a double majority of voters and cantons.26
25 This was done by two Ministers in October 1991 in the post-signing press conference in 
Luxembourg and later accepted by the government as a whole. However, the point is o f more 
general application since the opposition to the EEA were able to play back previous govern­
ment criticisms of the EU as such.
26 Most legal experts argued that, since the EEA was not a supranational entity, its ratification 
should be subject to the optional referendum, i.e. it should be submitted to a popular vote only 
if one is demanded by 50000 voters. In that case, it must win with a simple popular majority. 
Other experts argued that the EEA was a supranational body whose acceptation should be 
subject to the compulsory referendum. Irrespective of the Constitution, the Swiss government 
did not take a position on the legal debate, but decided that given the political importance of 




























































































Divided on the issue, with two out of seven of the Ministers repeatedly express­
ing their doubts about the EEA, the Swiss government had in addition limited 
means of leading the information campaign. For instance, Parliament prevented it 
from using TV for its campaign. Lastly, the government could not use the threat 
to resign as a strategic weapon to increase its impact: since the referendum arena 
is independent from the electoral arena in Switzerland, sanctioning the govern­
ment in a popular vote has no effect on its composition (Hug and Sciarini, 1995a).
Already a member of the EEA, Norway did not view full membership in the EU 
as an economic necessity.27 Its decision to apply for membership was based on 
three reasons.28 First, the vitalisation of the integration processes within the EC 
towards the end of the 1980s appealed to the pro-EU leadership in the Norwegian 
Labour government. Second, the breakdown of communism in Eastern Europe 
increased the viability of the realisation of Europe as an idea which could tran­
scend the divides between power blocs. Third, Sweden decided to move away 
from the traditional policy of neutrality, and started to drift towards a pro-EU 
position. This shift was a relatively strong pro-EU signal to Norway as Sweden 
had historically been much more negative to formal European integration than 
Norway. Despite a widespread fear that the issue might divide the party as it did 
in 1972, the leadership of Labour, headed by prime minister Gro Harlem Brundt- 
land, succeeded in persuading a large majority of party members to support the 
application for membership in the European Union. In the spring of 1994 the 
conditions for Norwegian membership were agreed on, and the Storting decided 
to hold an advisory referendum on the issue.29
27 It could, however, be noted that some Norwegian officials worried about the possible effects 
of trade and investment diversion as its Nordic neighbours moved toward membership. In ad­
dition, for some who were opposed to membership in the Union, EEA was used as an argu­
ment that Norway had the basic economic market access, so that it did not need the broader 
political Union; among those who were more strongly against integration, the EEA agreement 
signalled all the evils of the Union. All in all, however, the EEA was not a significant issue in the 
campaign Accordingly, it does not show frequently in the open-ended questions (see below).
28 This sketch is slightly modified from an analysis by Hjelseth, Jenssen and Listhaug (n.d ).
29 It became clear very early that a ‘no’-vote would mean that the pro-EU majority in the 
Storting would succumb to the will of the voters, while a narrow ‘yes’-vote in the referendum 
most likely would be blocked by a large enough minority in the Storting, as 75 percent of the 




























































































The debate over membership was to a large extent a repeat of the arguments from 
1972. Among the opposition a core argument was that joining the EU would 
weaken Norway’s political independence and democratic constitution. A political 
union along the lines suggested by the Maastricht Treaty evoked memories of the 
extremely unpopular union with Sweden, which was terminated in 1905. In the 
primary sector membership in the EU was seen as a threat to interests of farming 
and fisheries. The arguments concerning fish were partly framed in a resource 
perspective, as those opposed argued that it was unlikely that Norway as a mem­
ber state in the EU could continue to set the regime for how much could be har­
vested from the various stocks of fish in the Norwegian sea territories.30 The re­
source and regime control arguments probably strengthened the ‘no’-side among 
the publics not employed in the fisheries as this way of reasoning evoked sympa­
thy among environmentalists and appealed to national interests.
One of the arguments that was raised most strongly on the ‘yes’-side was that a 
rejection of membership would weaken Norway’s position within the alliance as 
the co-operation between the EU and NATO had become more vital. If Norway 
decided to stay outside the EU the role of the country in NATO would also most 
likely be reduced. Still on the ‘yes’-side, co-operation within the EU was seen as 
an extension of democracy beyond the borders of the nation-state. Among social 
democrats this development was seen as a way of at least potentially extending 
democratic control in areas where national democracy could not work.
Besides economic arguments, questions related to international alliances and con­
cerns of democracy, a long list of topics were linked to the EU-issue. Arguments 
pertaining to religion, alcohol, and language were evoked as well. Those holding 
fundamentalist positions in this area argued against membership, while liberals 
were in favour. Welfare state issues formed another key area of controversy. Fi­
nally, gender and sector were important issues in the ‘no’-campaign, since the EU 
was seen as a threat both to the interests of women and public employees.31
30 The minister of fisheries argued that the EU had agreed to support the Norwegian policy 
regime in this area, but this did not have much impact on the coast.
31 There was an overlap between the two arguments, since the rise of female participation in 




























































































The political parties took relatively clear positions in the EU campaign. Labour 
strongly supported membership but, in a shift from 1972, the party leadership 
chose a soft strategy to convince voters and party members. The prime minister 
did not threaten to resign if the outcome went against the party line, as prime 
minister Bratteli had in 1972. The party rhetoric tried to picture the EU as an in­
stitution that could control international big business and strengthen public policy 
in areas where national instruments and regulations could not be effective, like in 
the environment. With respect to the welfare state, it argued that some of the EU 
countries had more generous welfare arrangements than Norway, and that it 
would be possible to maintain national standards of social policy. In general, La­
bour stressed the regulating and public policy powers of the EU more than the 
free market nature of the union. The opposite strategy was chosen by the other 
major party on the left, the Socialist Left party, which took a strong stand against 
membership and presented the EU as a threat to the welfare state and as an insti­
tution that expanded the influence of market principles and capitalist interests in 
all areas of society. A minority in the Labour party formed an organised faction 
within the party, Social Democrats against the EU (SME). This was quite ex­
traordinary in a traditionally centralist party.
The Conservative party was the second major party in favour of membership. 
This party was, however, seriously weakened, following disastrous losses at the 
preceding elections. The rightist Progressive party was the third pro-EU party, 
although not very enthusiastically, since a sizeable faction in the party had the 
view that membership would lead to increased immigration and criticised the 
EU’s sizeable bureaucracy and desire to regulate the behaviour of its citizens.32 
The remaining parties were against membership. Among these, the agrarian Cen­
tre party, under the leadership of Anne Enger Lahnstein, was the dominant actor. 
In the Storting election of 1993 this party increased its vote share to 16.7 percent 
from 6.5 percent in 1989. It has been shown that the strong anti-EU position of 
the party contributed to its success at the election (Aardal, 1994). Based on its 
heydays of opposition to the union with Sweden and support for the peripheries, 
the leadership of the Liberal party opposed membership, but not with any deter­
32 Both the Conservative party and the Progressive party stressed the market principles and the 




























































































mination. Finally, the Christian People’s party also urged its followers to vote 
‘no’, although it was less principled in its opposition than the Centre party.
The interest organisations in the primary sector were strongly against member­
ship, business organisations were in favour, while labour unions were either 
against or neutral on the issue. In a major shift from 1972, a narrow majority in 
the national congress of LO, the main national labour union, which is traditionally 
very strongly linked to Labour, voted ‘no’ to membership.
For almost the entire period that the EU question has been on the agenda in Nor­
way, opinion polls have demonstrated that those opposing membership have been 
in the majority (Gleditsch and Hellevik, 1977; Bjorklund, 1994). It has also been 
shown that Norwegians have comparatively weak identifications with Europe 
(Huseby and Listhaug, 1995). The early substantial gap in favour of the ‘no’-vote 
demonstrates the deep-seated opposition towards European integration in Nor­
way.33 A significant shift in opinion occurred only in early October, when the 
‘yes’-side increased its share. The strong movement towards a more even distri­
bution of opinion presumably reflects the strong pressure from elites, most impor­
tantly by the government and the prime minister, to move citizens from a position 
of scepticism or neutrality on the issue toward a pro-EU stance.
Cleavages and the European votes: An Analysis o f Survey Data
On December 6,1992, the EEA Treaty was rejected by 50.3 percent of the voters 
and 16 cantons out of 23, on a very high -  for Swiss standards -  78.3 percent 
turnout. Two years later, on November 28, 1994, 52.2 percent of the Norwegian 
voters rejected membership in the EU, with a record turnout (89 percent). Analy­
ses based on survey data will help us to assess the role of cleavages in the refer­
endum votes (tables 1 and 2).34
33 At the time of the Storting election nearly 60 percent opposed membership, slightly less than 
25 percent were in favour, while the remaining 15 percent did not take a position on the issue. 
Towards the summer 1994 the proportion ‘against’ fell to a level slightly below 50 percent. 
The ‘yes’-side was strengthened but only reached a level close to 30 percent, about equal to 
the proportion of DKs.
34 In Switzerland, the interview data were collected by the GfS-Institut on a combination of 
random and quota sample. Full results are reported in Kriesi et al (1993). The interview data 




























































































Model 1 (Table 1) shows that the opposition to the EEA Treaty is strongest in 
eastern, southern and central parts of Switzerland and in rural areas.35 A majority 
of support only exists in the western part of Switzerland and to a lesser extent in 
the cities. Thus, there is a huge gap between the western part of the country, 
strongly in favour of the EEA, and the rest of the country, strongly opposed. 
Since the west of the country mostly corresponds to the French-speaking part, 
this result actually mirrors a linguistic cleavage between French-speaking can­
tons, on the one side, and German and Italian cantons, on the other As model 2 
shows, the French-speaking voters heavily support the EEA agreement (‘no’-vote 
37 percent lower), whereas the Italian-speaking voters, together with the German­
speaking voters (reference category), lean towards rejection. We can also see 
from model 2 that the opposition to the EEA is strong among farmers and to a 
lesser extent among skilled/unskilled workers. While the religious factor does not 
have any effect in the EEA vote, support for the Treaty is surprisingly higher 
among moderate left-wing voters than among centrist and right-wing voters, or 
among those having no party preference.
The full impact of traditional cleavages is estimated in model 3 (the variable south 
of Switzerland disappears, since it corresponds exactly to the Italian-speaking 
region). Taking into account both the territorial and linguistic variables simulta­
neously confirms that the strong support for the EEA in the western part of Swit­
zerland is mainly due to the attitude of French-speaking voters. Even controlled 
for the effect of living in a city, the effect of being attached to the primary sector 
remains very strong (‘no’-vote 30 percent higher). The inclusion of gender, age, 
education, sector of occupation and ecological orientation (model 4) does not 
change the impact of the old cleavages. Only two of these new cleavages are
sample, the survey was funded by a generous grant from the Ministry of Local Government 
and Labour. In both countries, the vote result was very close to fifty percent. Therefore, the 
respondents are divided into two groups of equal size on the dependent variable. The estimates 
o f OLS regression in this case will not be very different from those obtained with logit or 
probit techniques. Since the dependent variable is coded ‘yes’ = 0, and voted ‘no’ = 1, and the 
independent variable are all dummies, the unstandardized regression coefficients can be inter­
preted directly as percent changes in the ‘no’-vote.
35 The rural-urban cleavage is represented in model 1 by a dummy variable that differentiates 
between voters living in cities of more than lO'OOO inhabitants and voters living in rural areas. 




























































































significant: the ‘no’-vote decreases with the level of education and is slightly 
higher among voters with ecological priorities.36
Table 1: The impact o f cleavages in Swiss politics in the 1992 referendum on the 
EEA Treaty (voting no). Unstandardized regression coefficients (N 985).
T heo re tica l
va riab le
M odel 1 M odel 2 M odel 3 M odel 4 M odel 5
C onstan t 0 .57** 0 .51** 0 .47** 0.41** 0 .42**
T errito ria l L iv ing  in u rb a n  area -.12»* -.0 7 -.05 -.05
cleavage N orth -W est Sw itzerland* 0 .09 0  11 0 .15 0 .14*
C en tre 0 .0 6 0 .12 0 .13 0  12
E as t 0 .13» 0 .13* 0 .15* 0 .14*
South 0 .19**
W est -.19** -.02 -.01 -.02
C lass ical F rench -speak ing1’ -.37** -.25** -.25** -.24**
cleavages Ita lian -speak ing 0 .0 7 0 .20* 0 .20* 0 .22*
C a th o lic s ' 0 .06 0 0 2 0 .03 0 0 4
P ro tes tan ts 0 .03 0 .03 0 .04 0 .03
W o rk in g  in p r im ary  sec to r 0 .32** 0 .30** 0 .29** 0.25**
Skilled  o r  unsk illed  w o rk e r 0 .15** 0.15** 0 .12** 0.13**
F a r left -.18 -.12 -.12 -.10
M odera te  left -.17** -.16** -.15** -.13**
M oderate  righ t -.02 0 .00 0 .02 .03
F a r righ t 0 .09 0.11 0 .13 .15
N ew G ender (fem ale) -.01 -.01
cleavages B om  1930-1945*1 0 .05 0 .02
B om  1946-1960 0 .09 0 .07
B o m  1961 o r  la te r 0 .09 0 .05
H igh sch o o l' -.09* -.09*
U niversity -.15* -.13*
E m ployed  in p u b lic  sec to r -.04 - 0 4
E co log ica l o rien ta tion 0.08* 0.09*
P a rty S oc ia lis t p a rty 1 -.10*
iden tifica tion G reens 0 0 6
C hristian  D em ocratic  p a rty -.08
R ad ica l D em ocratic  p a r ty -.12*
L iberals/Independen ts 0 .24**
A grarian 0 .1 2 ’
E xtrem e-righ t 0 .33**
A djusted  R 2 0 .08 0 .13 0 .14 0  15 0 .17
‘ R eference  category: living in Z u rich ; b R eference  category : G erm an-speak ing
‘ R eference  category: no /o ther religion: i  R eference  category : b o m  before  1930
6 R eference  category: p rim ary  s c h o o l:f R eference  catego ry , no /o th e r p a r ty
** sign ifican t a t  0.01 level; * sign ifican t a t  0 .05  level.
36 We have constructed a dummy variable where 1 is the code for voters who chose among a 
battery of six items the ecological item as first priority ("priority of the society is ..." "to pro­




























































































Finally, the results with respect to partisanship (model 5) are, overall, in line with 
party recommendations. However, party identification is a consistent predictor of 
the vote for a limited number of parties, and increases only slightly the explained 
variance of the model .”  The ‘no’-vote is 10 and 12 percent lower among identifi­
ers of the Socialist party and of the Radical Democratic party, 12 percent higher 
among supporters of the Swiss People’s party, and up to 33 percent higher among 
partisans of extreme-right parties (Swiss Democrats and Freedom party).
In short, our findings highlight the significant impact of the linguistic, rural-urban, 
class, and education cleavages in the Swiss vote on the EEA,37 8 thus underlining a 
combination of economic and cultural considerations. The study of the arguments 
that the voters give for their choice will help us to clarify the role of these various 
cleavages. But let us first turn to the analysis of the Norwegian vote (Table 2).
In Norway, starting again with the territorial cleavage, we can see from model 1 
that living in an urban area reduces the probability of voting ‘no’ by 13 percent. 
The effect of the various regions look rather strange as they are all positive. But it 
should be kept in mind that the reference category is the Oslo-area, which was 
the only main region with a majority voting in favour of membership. The strong­
est effect is found for Northern Norway with a regression coefficient of .36, fol­
lowed by Mid-Norway (Trondelag), Western Norway, the South, and the Eastern 
interior. The urban-rural pattern in the vote was similar in Finland, Sweden, and
37 This result is in line with earlier findings in this field (Trechsel and Kriesi, 1996): studies 
based on survey (Kriesi, 1994; Trechsel and Sciarini, 1998) or aggregate (Hug, 1994b) data 
show that the impact of party recommendations on the electoral behaviour at referendums is 
rather limited The main reason for this is the high fragmentation and the structural weakness 
o f the Swiss party system, dependent on economic groups for the financing of referendum 
campaigns, the political parties usually have a low profile in this phase of the political process. 
On the other hand, recent analyses based on aggregate data underlines the impact of parliamentary 
consensus on the destiny of the legislative acts in the plebiscitary phase -  submitted to a vote or not, 
subsequently accepted or not (Sciarini and Trechsel, 1996, Trechsel and Sciarini, 1998).
38 Overall, these results fit analyses based on aggregate data at the commune level (Hug, 
Kummer and Vatter, 1993, Vatter 1994) that also stress the considerable impact of the linguis­
tic factor, which alone explains 70 percent of the variance of the vote; in a multivariate analysis 
including all relevant variables, the linguistic factor has an impact on the outcome of the vote 




























































































Norway, although the balance between ‘no’ and ‘yes’ was different.39 The results 
of model 2 are in line with predictions and show that almost all cleavages were 
active in influencing the referendum vote. The one exception is the working class 
cleavage which shows a zero impact on the vote. Affiliations with the three 
counter cultures all increase the likelihood for voting ‘no’. The same is true for 
occupations in the primary sector (farmers and fishermen), which increases the 
probability of voting ‘no’ by 34 percent While structural class location does not 
influence the vote, ideological left-right self-identification is heavily related to 
voting ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Here, we note a somewhat asymmetrical effect, as a position 
on the right strongly reduces the probability for voting ‘no’, while a position on 
the left is only weakly related to a vote against membership.
Model 3 makes it possible to sort out the prior regional effects when we similarly 
control for both class structure and cultural structure. The statistical overlap be­
tween these sets of variables leads to a reduction in the impact of most of the 
variables in the fuller model. Living in the South does not show a statistically 
significant disposition to vote ‘no’ in this model, although the coefficient has a 
positive sign. The addition of new cleavages does not change the impact of the 
old cleavages (model 4). The youngest voters (bom in 1961 and later) are more 
likely to vote ‘no’ than voters in the oldest generation (bom before 1930). 
Women have a 9 percent higher probability of voting ‘no’, and public sector em­
ployees show a 7 percent higher probability in favour of a ‘no’-vote. Persons with 
higher education are more likely to vote ‘yes’. A positive ecological orientation 
goes with a 10 percent higher probability of voting ‘no’ .40
39 In Norway 14 of the 19 counties showed majorities for ‘no’ (Moses and Jenssen, 1995). A 
more detailed examination based on data from the communes are presented in Pettersen, Jens­
sen, and Listhaug (1996).
40 We have constructed an index for ecological orientation This is included in model 4 as a 
dummy variable where 1 is the code for voters who say that they strongly agree that Norway 
should not lower its environmental standards and that they strongly support a society that is 




























































































Table 2: 'Ihe impact o f cleavages in Norwegian politics in the 1994 referendum on 
EU-membership (voting ‘no ’). Unstandardized regression coefficients (N 2427)
T heo re tica l
variab le
E m pirica l va riab le M odel 1 M odel 2 M odel 3 M odel 4 M odel 5
C onstan t 0.45** 0 5 2 * * 0 4 6 * * 0.37** 0.48**
T errito ria l L iv ing  in u rb an  area -.13** -.07** -.07** -.07**
cleavage N orthern  N orw ay* 0.36** 0 .30** 0.28** 0 .24**
M id -N orw ay  (T  rondelag) 0.20** 0 .19** 0.18** 0 .16**
W este rn  N o rw ay 0.16** 0 .08** 0 .08** 0 .06*
Southern  N o rw ay  (A gder) 0.14** 0 .08 0 .08 0 .06
E aste rn  in terio r 0 .13** 0 .10** 0 .10** 0 .07**
C lass ica l T ee to ta lle r 0 .19** 0 .17** 0 .17** 0 .11**
cleavages W ritin g  in n yno rsk  language 0  14** 0 .13** 0 .13** 0 .09**
M em ber o f  re lig ious o rgan. 0 .12** 0 .14** 0 .13** 0 .08**
W o rk in g  in p rim ary  sec to r 0 3 4 * * 0 .28** 0 .32** 0 .17**
Skilled  o r  unskilled  w orker -.00 -.00 0.01 0 .03
F a r  left 0 .15* 0 .12* 0 .13* 0 .10
M oderate  left 0 .02 0 .0 2 0.01 0 .04
M oderate  righ t -.23** -.21** -.19** -.13**
F a r right -.36** -.33** -.31** -.18**
N ew G ender (fem ale) 0 .09** 0 .08**
c leavages B om  1930-1945b -.00 0 .0 0
B o m  1946 -1960 0 .02 -.01
B om  1961 o r  la te r 0 .10** 0 .0 4
H igh  schoo l0 -.09* -.09*
C ollege, U n iversity -.09** -.11**
E m ployed  in pu b lic  sec to r 0 .07** 0 .05*
E co log ica l orien ta tion 0 .10** 0 .06*
P a rty S o c ia lis t L eft p a rty '1 0 .19**
identification L a b o u r p a r ty -.25**
L ibera l p a r ty - 0 6
C en tre  p a r ty 0 .30**
C hris tian  P eo p le ’s p a r ty 0 .21**
C o n serv a tiv e  p a r ty -.27**
P rog ress ive  p a rty -.07
A d justed  R 2 0 .07 0 .14 0 .18 0.21 0 .3 0
* R eference  category: liv ing  in O slo , A kershus, V estfo ld  o r  0 s tfo ld  (T he  O slo -a rea )
R eference category : b o m  befo re  1930
‘ R eference  category: p rim ary  school and  add itional education  up  to  11 years
R eference category : n o  party -iden tif ica tion
** sign ifican t a t  th e  0 01 level; * sign ifican t a t  th e  0 .05  level
The inclusion of party identification (model 5) increases the explained variance 




























































































tent with the position that the party took on the issue.41 The effect of identifica­
tion with Conservatives is minus 27 and with Labour minus 25, showing that op­
position to EU membership within the Labour did not appeal to the party’s sup­
porters. Among those who identify with the Centre party, the Christian People’s 
party and the Socialist Left party a strong effect in favour of ‘no’ is observed. 
Thus, in sharp contrast with the Swiss case, party identification proves to be a 
strong and consistent predictor of the referendum vote in Norway.
According to our empirical results, the centre-periphery, rural-urban, counter­
cultures, and the left-right cleavages, as well as partisanship, had a significant 
impact on the referendum vote in Norway. As it did in 1972, the EU-issue in 
1994 revitalised the otherwise declining cleavages in Norwegian politics 
(Pettersen, Jenssen and Listhaug, 1996; Sogner and Archer, 1995).
The 'Yes’and 'No'Arguments
To further elaborate on factors that determined the voters’ decision, we present in 
tables 3 and 4 (for Switzerland) and in tables 5 and 6 (for Norway) the arguments 
that the voters give for their choice. The classification is based on answers to an 
open ended question.
Table 3 shows that various arguments were invoked by the ‘no’-side in Switzer­
land. While sovereignty and related issues were the most frequent arguments, 
criticism of the EU, fear of foreigners and more general reasons such as prefer­
ence for the status quo were also significant. This wide category of arguments of 
the political culture, which enters for half of the arguments on the ‘no’-side, mir­
rors a defence of Swiss traditions (Kriesi et al., 1993, p. 44), i.e. the fear that in­
tegration into the EEA would threaten the very existence of traditional Switzer­
land. A second category of arguments is oriented towards economic factors 
(economic policy, employment, agriculture). Some voters also mentioned the lack
41 The leadership o f the Liberal party, although somewhat more coherent in its opposition to 
membership this time than in 1972, did not meet with success among its rank and file as their 
voters leaned more in the direction o f ‘yes’ than ‘no’, although the effect does not reach statis­
tical significance. It is also noteworthy to observe that the supporters o f the Progressive party 
do not vote ‘yes’ in a statistically significant way. The existence of two wings of the party, a 
liberal, free market, faction, and a populist, partly nationalist and anti-immigration faction, 
made it difficult to take a strong position on the issue, which is reflected in the regression co­




























































































of information or the unclear message given by the Swiss government as a reason 
to reject the Treaty.42
Table 3: Arguments given for voting ‘No ' to Swiss membership in the European 
Economic Area. Percent o f all arguments given
Sovereignty, democracy, absence of codecision 16
Criticism of the EU and the EU system 12
Fear o f foreigners/border control 8
Too fast, too early 6
We know what we have, but... 4




Lack of information, government not clear 11
Environmental concerns 3
Other No-arguments 12
In the ‘yes’-camp (table 4), economic arguments are at first glance decisive: eco­
nomic policy and advantages related to the four freedoms are mentioned by one 
third of the voters. Including the arguments close to the political culture leads, 
however, to a more balanced conclusion. In fact, quantitatively, this second cate­
gory is even larger that the first one. Altogether, arguments regarding the fear of 
isolation, the willingness to open the country to the outside world or to prepare 
the country’s ftiture enter for more than half of the ‘yes’-arguments. Thus, cul­
tural grounds have been decisive on the ‘yes’-side, too.
Beyond economic considerations, two antagonistic conceptions of the country 
and its ftiture, i.e. two different definitions of Swiss identity, clashed on Decem­
ber 6, 1992 (Kriesi et al., 1993, p. 47; Vatter, 1994, p. 37). While supporters of 
the EEA wanted to promote an open Switzerland, the opposition wanted to de­
fend the traditional Switzerland that stands for its myths and venerates the cour­
age of remaining alone. This result confirms the strengthening of a new cleavage 
that divides the Swiss electorate along a dimension of the desired level of open­
42 An analysis of letters to the editors underlines the widespread mistrust in the government in 




























































































ness versus closedness of the country. First identified in the analysis of the struc­
tural and cultural cleavages of Swiss politics that emerged on national referen- 
dums during the eighties on issues relating to the army, labour and foreigners 
(Sardi and Widmer, 1993), this conflict seems particularly salient in referendums 
on foreign policy (Sciarini, 1996b), as the popular vote against the creation of a 
Swiss blue helmets corps recently showed (Wemli et al., 1994).
Table 4: Arguments given fo r  voting ‘Yes' to Swiss membership in the European 
Economic Area. Percent o f all arguments given
Economic Policy, four freedoms 27
Employment 6
Fear of isolation, impossible to remain outside 22 
Participation, co-operation, openness 21
For the youth, its tuture 9
Against the nationalist ‘no’ 2
First step toward EU membership 1
Other Yes-arguments__________  12
Table 5: Arguments given for voting ‘N o’ to Norwegian membership in the 
European Union. Percent o f all arguments given43
Sovereignty, democracy 26
Criticism of the EU and the EU system 12
Language, religion, alcohol 3
Border control, drugs, etc. 3




Fisheries, fish quotas 5
Regional policy 4
Welfare state, pensions, etc. 3
Environmental concerns 7
Other No-arguments 10





























































































In Norway, we also find the two broad categories of arguments described above 
for Switzerland, namely political culture-driven arguments, on the one side, and 
economic arguments, on the other. Entering in the former, the most prevalent ar­
gument given among those voting ‘no’ is related to Norwegian sovereignty and 
democracy (chosen by about one fourth, Table 5). These voters saw EU- 
membership as reducing the impact of national democratic institutions. Criticism 
of the EU and the EU-system, counter-culture issues or border control are other 
expressions of this political culture-driven opposition. The second (economic) 
category of arguments contains issues related to economic policy, employment, 
agriculture and fisheries. A third category of ‘no’-arguments is more closely re­
lated to specific Norwegian issues (regional policy, welfare state).
Again, on the ‘yes’-side support for membership is driven by cultural and eco­
nomic motives (Table 6). Participation and co-operation with other European 
countries, fear of isolation if Norway did not join, cultural integration and the 
creation of a United States of Europe represent about 40 percent of the arguments 
given. Support of the market principles of the EU and employment are mentioned 
by more than one fourth of the electorate. Defence and security issues were also 
significant in the eyes of voters. Finally, it is noteworthy that concern for the envi­
ronment was of equal importance on the two sides. It was mentioned by 7 percent 
for ‘no’ and 6 percent for ‘yes’.
Table 6: Arguments given for voting ‘Yes' to Norwegian membership in the 
European Union. Percent o f all arguments given
Participation, co-operation 21
Fear of isolation 10
Cultural integration 7
For a United States of Europe 2



































































































In this article, we have tried to compare the factors that shaped the Swiss and 
Norwegian European policies. We argued that Katzenstein’s framework fails to 
take into account important factors that influence the flexibility of the small Euro­
pean states. The bottom-line is that European integration, as a central dimension 
of the process of globalisation, is associated with new kinds of challenges that 
Katzenstein’s framework is unable to capture. First, we showed that integration 
into the single European market threatened Switzerland’s and Norway’s dual 
economic policy. Second, the European referendums revitalised old cleavages in 
Norwegian and Swiss politics. According to Katzenstein (1984, p. 131, 1985), 
the economic and political success of the small European states lies in their ca­
pacity to combine economic flexibility with political stability. Switzerland’s and 
Norway’s difficulty in responding to the deepening of the European integration 
process suggests, however, that political stability may turn into political rigidity. 
Among other factors, direct democratic institutions, which Katzenstein did not 
include in his framework, can prove to have a crucial impact on the small states’ 
‘flexibility’.
The Norwegian and Swiss referendums on Europe provide a case in hand in this 
respect. Here, we found some differences but also some strong similarities be­
tween the two votes. The two countries most clearly differ on the role of partisan­
ship and the impact of left-right ideological orientation. While the Norwegian 
vote provides a clear support for those who argue that parties play a decisive role 
in shaping the voter’s decision in referendums on Europe (Franklin et al. 1994, 
1995; Hug and Sciarini 1995b; Pierce, Valen and Listhaug, 1983),44 those who 
claim that parties are sidelined in European referendums (e.g. Bogdanor, 1994) 
will find some empirical support for their argument in the Swiss vote.
The left-oriented voters were the most fervent supporters of the EEA in Switzer­
land, whereas voters with centre and right-wing ideological orientations (or sup­
porters of centre and right-wing parties), mostly chose ‘no’. In Norway a per­
44 Note that, according to Franklin and his colleagues, the influence of partisanship in Euro­
pean votes has little to do with Europe: they claim that these votes are mainly "second order 
elections", i.e. that they should be viewed in terms of domestic standing of the government that 




























































































fectly opposite pattern prevails. If one assumes that the EU project is mostly lib­
eral in nature, or at least that liberalisation and deregulation have been the promi­
nent policy achievement so far (Traxler and Schmitter, 1995, p. 210), the natural 
supporters of European integration should be located on the right side of the po­
litical spectrum This is what can be observed in Norway. For instance, the Con­
servatives took a clear stance in favour of membership and were followed by their 
identifiers. This interpretation, however, raises two questions: First, how can we 
explain that in Switzerland and Norway the Social Democratic parties have been 
among the strongest promoters of EEA/EU membership? Second, how can we 
explain that Swiss supporters of right-wing parties or voters with rightist ideo­
logical orientation voted against the EEA Treaty? The response to the first ques­
tion lies presumably in the fact that the EU construction can not be reduced to a 
liberal programme in economic terms, but is also an institution that promotes 
other kinds of liberal values like the free movement of people, individual and 
democratic rights, and so on. Furthermore, the EU is also interested in promoting 
values that seem attractive for the left, for instance in the field of the cohesion, 
structural and regional policies. As we mentioned before, the Norwegian Labour 
party tried to downplay the free-market nature of the EU in favour of the EU as a 
vehicle of regulation and control in domains where national governments and 
state were ineffective (multinationals, environment) 45 In Switzerland, the task 
was even easier for the left, since taking part in the EEA was expected to produce 
improvements of the social policy (defence of workers, social insurance, equality 
between sexes, etc ).
As for the second question, one reason why Swiss right-wing citizens voted ‘no’ 
to the EEA could be that, as was stressed in the second section, Switzerland is 
actually a model of selective liberalism, with many domestic sectors feeling 
threatened by integration into the EEA. Another, in our view more convincing, 
reason lies in the fact that economic factors were less relevant in the voters’ de­
cision than factors related to political culture, and more especially the defence of 
traditions and national sovereignty. This interpretation found strong empirical
45 The fact that individuals with a centre-left ideology and those employed in the public sector 
voted against membership demonstrates, however, that the Labour leadership did not fully suc­





























































































support in the arguments given by voters for their choice and in the impact of 
cultural cleavages on the voters’ decision, in both Switzerland and Norway.
Thus, the centre-periphery cleavage and its several cultural underpinnings had a 
significant impact on the referendum vote in Norway. The resistance of the tradi­
tional minorities can be interpreted as a fear felt by these groups that European 
integration would strengthen the processes of cultural standardisation and secu­
larisation and weaken minority cultures. In Switzerland, a somewhat similar 
conflict along cultural lines (the linguistic cleavage) was also the most striking 
cleavage in the EEA vote, although it can not be assimilated to a centre-periphery 
conflict. Here, it is the French-speaking minority that favoured European integra­
tion, while both the German-speaking majority -  and more especially the small 
rural cantons -  and the Italian-speaking minority rejected it. Differences between 
the linguistic communities are, of course, not simply linked to the use of a particu­
lar language, but are rooted in the culture that this language mirrors. More spe­
cifically, the linguistic regions hold strongly opposing views on the openness ver­
sus closedness dimension. It is commonly assumed that the European issue heav­
ily contributes to the strengthening of the linguistic cleavage and is responsible 
for the current crisis of Swiss identity (Sciarini, Hug and Dupont, 1997).46
In other words, both the Swiss and the Norwegian cases show that if joining the 
EU -  be it through full membership or through membership in the EEA -  is not 
perceived as an economic necessity, cultural and political factors may have a de­
cisive impact. In such a case, voters tend to prefer the country to defend its 
specificity and traditions, and opt out of the European integration process. The 
positive Norwegian economic situation, together with the fact that it was already 
a member of the EEA, made it seem less necessary than in other Scandinavian 
countries to give up national independence, which in turn has a much higher 
status in Norway because of its long history of foreign occupation (Janh and 
Storsved, 1995, p. 33). The same could be said about Switzerland’s secular tradition 
of neutrality and fight for independence. Given this similar profile towards European
46 According to opinion polls, French-speaking citizens have felt more European than German- 
speaking citizens for several years (Kriesi et al 1993, p. 11), and priority towards the European 
integration has been significantly higher among the former (Widmer and Buri, 1992, p 367) One 
reason for this could be, in the German-speaking community, the fear of Germany, as well as the 
willingness to avoid losing leadership on Switzerland. The French-speaking community, conversely, 




























































































integration, Switzerland and Norway do not appear as single cases but, rather, as a 
unique pair, regardless of the relations that they may have with each other.
This does not, however, mean, that the EU is no longer an issue in Swiss and 
Norwegian politics. The reverse is true in Switzerland, where European integra­
tion has become a central -  maybe the central -  political issue. After the rejection 
of the EEA agreement the Swiss-EU talks were relaunched on a bilateral basis. 
Negotiations come up against two issues that were among the most controversial 
in the EEA talks: free movement of people and transport. Assuming that an 
agreement will be reached by the beginning of 1997, it will possibly have to over­
come the hurdle of the popular vote: those who opposed the EEA have warned 
that they will call for a referendum against any agreement leading to free move­
ment of people. Furthermore, three popular initiatives on EU matters are pending, 
the latest asking for full membership in the EU. However, given the polarisation 
of attitudes caused by the EEA vote and the specific constitutional provision that 
applies for a vote on EU membership (both the majority of the people and the 
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